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Who Speaks for the Past? 
Social Media, Social Memory, and the Production of Historical 
Knowledge in Contemporary China 
 
JUN LIU1 
University of Copenhagen, Denmark 
 
This study explores the influence of social media on the (re)formation of social memory 
and the production of historical knowledge in society. It takes several contested debates 
over historical events and figures on Weibo, one of the most widely used social media, 
as the case to investigate how social media enable people to articulate previously 
unspoken experiences and memories, question the authenticity and accuracy of official 
history, and shape social recollection in China. This study argues that social media 
embrace a wide variety of diverse individuals as subjects who contribute to various 
mnemonic practices, facilitate the crowdsourcing and aggregation of alternative or 
counternarratives of the past, and cultivate the production of historical knowledge as a 
retrievable and reactivatable process. The contestation facilitated by social media over 
mnemonic knowledge transcends what happened in history and memory and sheds light 
on the complex political and cultural contentions in contemporary China.  
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Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past. 
—George Orwell, 1984 
 
On July 24, 2015, Chinese officials named a new monthly magazine Lei Feng in honor of the 
exemplary soldier who was widely popular in the 1960s. Particularly, the magazine aims to refute the 
argument against the authenticity of the stories of Lei Feng on the Internet (Yuen, 2015). The release of 
the magazine was not a singular event. It was part of a full-scale national propaganda campaign initiated 
by the Chinese authorities to “rectify the names of the heroes” by rebutting “rumors” against the 
authenticity of some long-revered Communist heroes and by quashing doubts over the accuracy of their 
stories on the Internet (Ni, 2015). Key official news organizations, including Xinhua News Agency and 
People’s Daily, are all engaging in the campaign. with a cascade of reports responding to widespread 
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skepticism about the stories of the heroes and growing cynicism toward these stories on Weibo, the 
Chinese social media platform (e.g., Chen & Tan, 2015; X. Liu, 2015). 
 
These events exemplify a relevant but less frequently investigated and perhaps inadequately 
understood political influence of social media in contemporary China: Apart from its affordance as a means 
of facilitating protests in contemporary contentions (e.g., Huang & Sun, 2014; Tong & Zuo, 2014), social 
media also aid the emergence, dissemination, and understanding of disagreements about contested 
historical information, which challenge the authorized knowledge of the past and forces the authorities to 
respond to this information. Put differently, with a strong preference for contention centering on 
contemporary events, existing scholarship overlooks the impact of social media on the (re)construction of 
historical knowledge. 
 
This study aims to fill this gap by scrutinizing the influence of social media—Weibo in this case—
on the social memory and the production of historical knowledge in contemporary China. It investigates 
how people use Weibo as a platform to interrogate the official knowledge of the past, articulate individual 
memories, and reconstruct social memory, all of which shape the production of historical knowledge in 
society. I first provide a critical review of current studies on digital media—social media in particular—and 
politics in China, addressing the relevance of approaching such a topic from a long-term perspective. In 
this case, social memory acts as an example of historical knowledge. Second, I introduce a theoretical 
framework for social media, social memory, and the production of historical knowledge, with a focus on 
social media as “technologies of memory” (Armstrong & Crage, 2006, p. 745) in the process of 
(re)constructing memory and commemorative practices. Third, I elaborate my methodology, and follow 
this with an overview of selected cases on Weibo—several contested debates over this historical event 
(i.e., “the Three Years of Great Chinese Famine” [hereafter “the Great Famine”]; see J. Yang, 2012) and 
historical figures in the Mao era, such as Lei Feng, Huang Jiguang, and Qiu Shaoyun, who were once 
national role models but are now controversial figures on Weibo. Fourth, I dissect how people use Weibo 
not only to question and satirize the official discourse regarding this event and these figures, but also to 
articulate and disseminate alternative historical stories and counternarratives of the past that the public 
had previously never been allowed to know. I argue that the articulation, accumulation, and dissemination 
of experiences, memories, dissensions, and incredulities on Weibo engender alternative mechanisms of 
the production of historical knowledge and establish “countermemory” (Foucault, 1980) that contends 
against the official framework of remembrance, reshaping the social memory of the past and thereby 
generating a long-term political impact on society. I conclude with thoughts on the political implications of 
Weibo on the (re)construction of social memory and the mechanisms of the production of historical 
knowledge in contemporary China. 
 
Digital Media and Politics in Contemporary China: A Critical Review 
 
The impact of digital media on politics has emerged as a substantial focus in the study of 
information and communication technologies in contemporary China (e.g., Esarey & Xiao, 2011; G. Yang, 
2009). A number of thorough studies have discussed the increasingly prominent role of digital media in 
contemporary political contention in the processes of information distribution, claims-making, network-
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bridging, repertoire diversification, and movement collaboration and mobilization (e.g., Huang & Sun, 
2014; Tong & Zuo, 2014; G. Yang, 2009). 
 
Nevertheless, current scholarship remains largely dominated by case studies of contention 
around current issues, be they environmental issues, social injustice, or major accidents (e.g., Tong & 
Zuo, 2014; G. Yang, 2009). Such a focus presents a far too restricted view of politics, one that privileges 
sporadic—or “short-lived” (Tong & Zuo, 2014, p. 69)—confrontations around contemporary events (but 
see L. Yang, 2010; Zhang, 2012). As studies have shown, first, the use of digital media not only shapes 
the unfolding of current events, it also affects the way in and through which people express, interpret, 
negotiate, and archive the past (e.g., Keightley & Schlesinger, 2014; Neiger, Meyers, & Zandberg, 2011; 
van Dijck, 2007). Second, the current approach fails to provide a comprehensive picture of structural 
change that has been introduced by the integration of information and communication technologies into 
Chinese life. Consequently, it is unable to recognize the long-term or “gradual revolution” introduced by 
the imprints, or cumulative effects, of digital media on politics in Chinese society (G. Yang, 2011, p. 
1045). To advance understanding of these issues, this study proposes to broaden the scope of 
interrogation by taking social memory as a crucial topic to expound possible, long-term social and cultural 
changes introduced by digital media in contemporary China. 
 
Social Memory in Social Media: A Research Agenda 
 
In his work On Collective Memory, Halbwachs (1992) establishes a foundational framework for 
the study of societal remembrance. As “a socially constructed notion” (Coser, 1992, p. 22), collective 
memory represents a society’s understanding of its past, defines the relationship between the individual 
and society, and enables a community to preserve its self-image and to transfer it through time. 
 
However, as Halbwachs (1992) explicates, “collective memory must be distinguished from 
[emphasis added] history” (p. 222). Instead, it is “essentially a reconstruction [emphasis added] of the 
past in the light of the present” (Coser, 1992, p. 34; also see Bodnar, 1994; Jansen, 2007; Wagner-
Pacifici & Schwartz, 1991). In other words, the concern and structure of the present determine the 
selective perception of history, and the past is accordingly “shaped by the concerns of the present” 
(Coser, 1992, p. 22; also see Bond & Gilliam, 1994). In this process, for individuals, their memories are 
de facto a manipulated construction of those who maintain power and status and who supervise the 
images of the past. Halbwachs (chapter 1) underlines the key role of the “social frameworks for memory,” 
within which individuals localize, organize, and remember commemorative events in mnemonic 
landscapes. This process consequently reinforces officially sanctioned collective memory.  
 
In the following decades, later scholars advanced Halbwachs’ (1992) work in various ways, in 
particular, elucidating the relation among power, counterpower, and the (re)construction of memory. 
Some assert that the representations of collective memory are those that have been specifically selected 
by people in power, aiming to ensure the legitimacy of dominance, the reproduction of the status quo, and 
the consolidation of existing power (e.g., Alonso, 1988; Armstrong & Crage, 2006; Bodnar, 1994; Boyarin, 
1994; Nora, 1996). Others maintain that collective memory is a process that is constantly unfolding, 
appropriating, and transforming in a “dynamic and unexpected” way (Steiner & Zelizer, 1995, p. 221; also 
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see Jansen, 2007; Zarecka, 1994). Social, political, and cultural factors engage in the negotiation of 
memory—or “the politics of memory” (Jansen, 2007, p. 959)—in which different narratives compete for a 
place in the reconstruction of the past (Sturken, 1997; also see Brockmeier, 2002; Zandberg, 2010). In 
this sense, the memorial presence of the past becomes both a tool and an object of power subject to 
contestation, appropriation, and transformation at different points in time. 
 
One particularly vibrant area of discussion concerning this kind of memory negotiation and 
contestation emerges from Foucault’s (1980) notion of countermemory, which refers to memories that run 
different from, and often counter to, the official (frameworks of) history. Countermemory involves the 
memorialization—the politics of mnemonic practices—of forgotten, suppressed, or excluded histories as a 
crucial way of resisting oppression and dominant ideologies (Berdahl, 1999; Brown, 2010; Esbenshade, 
1995; Medina, 2011). As Foucault (1995) argues, power and domination define what knowledge is and 
what it should be, as well as its boundaries; they also disqualify illegitimate forms of knowledge that they 
consider unacceptable. Following his argument, on the one hand, mechanisms of power and domination 
control and produce different types of historical knowledge—as “social frameworks for memory” 
(Halbwachs, 1992, p. 34)—which guide, mold, and restrain people’s acts of memorialization and reinforce 
exercises of power. In this way, “power and memory are most intimately embraced in the representations 
of official histories which are central to the production and reproduction of hegemony” (Alonso, 1988, p. 
50). On the other hand, as “oppositional knowledge-production” (Gutman, 2015), countermemory 
promotes the production, dissemination, and consolidation of alternative understandings and 
interpretations of the past from the dominant ones (Brown, 2010; Gutman, 2015). Memory contestation 
thus epitomizes the struggle between the dominant and the subordinate in a society and influences the 
production of historical knowledge. This process crystallizes the relevance of mnemonic capacity, or “the 
skills and resources need[ed] to create commemorative vehicles” (Armstrong & Crage, 2006, p. 726), to 
nonstate actors for the emergence of new—albeit not essentially counter—memorials that shape what 
societies know about their pasts. 
 
Among many factors, ICTs emerge as “technologies of memory” (Armstrong & Crage, 2006, p. 
745) in the process of formatting, reconstructing, and mediating memory and commemorative practices 
(e.g., Haskins, 2007; Hess, 2007; Neiger et al., 2011; van Dijck, 2007). Given its technological 
affordances such as openness, accessibility, availability, and interactivity, social media not only enable but 
also encourage alternative and counterhistorical narratives to emerge and proliferate from the ordinary 
against official versions of history (e.g., Amazeen, 2014; Reading, 2003). This process significantly affects 
the production of knowledge of the past. In the case of China, few studies note that digital media, including 
virtual museums and bulletin board systems, allow people to engage in the (counter)narrative of localized 
histories and personal stories about, for instance, memories of the Cultural Revolution (CR; L. Yang, 2010; 
Zhang, 2012), contributing to “the opening of China’s political spaces” (G. Yang, 2005, p. 33). 
 
Existing studies, however, give less attention to the emerging role of Weibo in constructing the 
memorial presence of the past. With more than one third of the Chinese Internet population as its users 
(i.e., 242 million), Weibo has emerged as the most popular social media platform in China. More than 126 
million active daily users (China Internet Network Information Center [CNNIC], 2016, p. 30) have 
established Weibo as a vibrant, contested, and high-visibility space in which people express and share 
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opinions on political issues, disclose and criticize government malfeasance, and mobilize and coordinate 
political action even “before authorities and censors c[an] react” (Chan, Wu, Hao, Xi, & Jin, 2012, p. 348). 
Meanwhile, the authorities are struggling to keep Weibo under effective control (e.g., Sullivan, 2014). 
More important, Weibo entails a highly interactive environment with a low threshold of participation. 
Discussions and retweets help topics to quickly peak or “trend” to receive large-scale attention (Yu, Asur, 
& Huberman, 2015). The accessibility of microblogging on Weibo via both website and mobile app reduces 
inequalities in access. Interaction on Weibo unfolds in an informal, conversational way, instead of a careful 
deliberation as happens when writing weblogs, and this easy and casual pace encourages various modes 
of public engagement over a broad range of topics. 
 
To fill this gap, this study explores the role of Weibo in (re)shaping social memory in 
contemporary China. Following Olick and Robbins’ (1998) suggestion, I use the term social memory, which 
involves “distinct sets of mnemonic practices in various social sites” (p. 112), as this inclusive definition 
allows us to observe a wide variety of mnemonic activities in society. Moreover, according to Swidler and 
Arditi (as cited in Olick & Robbins, 1998), social memory studies should move toward “structures of 
knowledge or consciousness that shape the thinking of laypersons” (p. 108). Exploring ordinary people’s 
mnemonic practices thereby allows us to detect and reveal potential structural changes in both 
commemoration and the broader society. In this sense, I asked the following research questions: 
 
RQ1:  What kinds of narratives of the past have been articulated and circulated and who has been 
circulating them on Weibo? 
 
RQ2:  How are the narratives found on Weibo different from the official narrative or the dominant social 
framework for memory?  
 
RQ3:  How and to what extent do the narratives of the past on Weibo challenge or change social 




I used a case study design (Yin, 2014) to look into the acts of memorialization on Weibo, in 
particular, how Weibo articulates (the query about) the narrative of the past and the ways in which it 
shapes social memory through these acts. Cases were drawn from high-profile contestations of historical 
events and figures in the Mao era on Weibo, including the debate over the Great Famine (Zhao & Liu, 
2015) as well as the debate over historical figures such as Lei Feng, Dong Cunrui, Huang Jiguang, and Qiu 
Shaoyun, who were once national role models or national martyrs but are now controversial figures on the 
Internet (e.g., Cao, 2015; Li, 2015; “State Media Play Good Cop/Bad Cop," 2015). Gaining widespread 
attention in society, the cases entail both “critical” and “revelatory” characterizations that offer insights 
into underexplored phenomena and help “refocus future investigations” (Yin, 2014, pp. 51–52). The cases 
are presented in the next section. 
 
I present data collected through participant observation and immersion (Boellstorff, Nardi, 
Pearce, & Taylor, 2012, Chapter 5) in the cases on Weibo. In the case of the Great Famine, for several 
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continuous hours with sustained attention I observed the start of the debate, monitoring the nuances and 
changes within the debates and the critical developments throughout the whole process,2 taking field 
notes about how Weibo users interacted with each other and discussed the issues, and recording—
sometimes taking screenshots of—tweets in the debate hour by hour. The specific duration of participant 
observation lasted from 11:00 to 16:00 (CET), corresponding to the peak times for Weibo use (i.e., 
18:00–23:00 in China; CNNIC, 2016, p. 30). I also gathered the tweets and postings by doing keyword 
searches (including Zhibo Lin, the Great Famine, the Three Years of Natural Disasters, and the Three 
Years of Economic Difficulty in the case of the Great Famine and the names of the figures in the remaining 
cases) on Weibo. I also marked the original and relevant tweets as favorites (e.g., those by Weibo 
celebrities) and, by following hashtags, such as #theGreatFamine, received and retrieved the latest tweets 
under the hashtags even after the debates and discussions had closed. The tweet corpus included 655 
tweets. I further collected information from publications and media reports about the debates on the cases 
as objects of analysis (e.g., Cao, 2015; “Doubts,” 2015; Li, 2015; M. Liu, 2012; X. Liu, 2015; Ni, 2015). 
 
With the heuristic purpose of theoretical exploration (Vaughan, 1992), I conducted an analysis of 
data from Weibo and traditional media. To work with participant observation data from Weibo, I followed 
the guideline from Boellstorff et al. (2012, pp. 168–179): Two researchers read the tweets independently, 
looked for thematic elements, categorized them, integrated field notes into the analysis, and highlighted 
key phrases and statements to identify explanations inductively that illuminated the research questions. 
With the explorative nature of the study, the focus was to develop detailed analytical narratives of these 
cases, interpreting various mnemonic practices on Weibo through which people engaged the narratives of 
the past, in particular. It is necessary to point out that the cases, all coming from the historical events and 
figures in Mao’s era, may not be interpreted strictly as a representative sampling of the historical narrative 
on Weibo. Nevertheless, the cases still highlight issues of special relevance for an understanding of the 
long-term influence of Weibo on social memory beyond a simple realization of sporadic contentious 
possibility. 
 
Debating Historical Events and Figures in the Mao Era on Weibo: The Cases 
 
This section presents a description of the cases (i.e., the debates covering two types of historical 
narratives, memories, and descriptions of the past): One focuses on a historical event (the Great Famine). 
The other discusses famous historical figures from the Mao era. Sample tweets have been drawn randomly 
                                               
2 The main debate over the Great Famine lasted from April 29 to May 2, 2012. The discussions on Lei Feng 
started early March with the annual “Learn From Lei Feng Day” (March 5) and lasted three to four weeks. 
In April 2013, the debate was galvanized by Weibo celebrity Qinhuohuo’s (nickname) tweet. The 
discussions on Qiu Shaoyun were initiated at the end of October 2012, but went viral after Zuoyeben 
(nickname), a Weibo celebrity with more than 8.7 million followers, posted a tweet joking about Qiu’s 
heroic self-sacrifice, saying, “Because Qiu Shaoyun was lying in the fire and didn’t move, diners refused to 
pay for the half-done and half-rare barbeque and preferred roasted Lai Ning (a teenager who died in a 
forest fire in the late 1980s)” (Sun, 2013). On April, 16, 2015, the discussion was again provoked by a 
tweet from Zuoyeben (11:28). The debates and doubts over Dong Cunrui and Huang Jiguang proliferated 
in July 2015 on Weibo (see “Doubts,” 2015). 
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from the data collected. In general, the debate demonstrates a distinct disjunction and disarticulation 
between individual narratives and memories and the authorized narratives and frameworks of the past. 
 
The Debate Over the Great Famine 
 
The debate over the Great Famine was triggered by Lin Zhibo, the head of the Gansu Province 
branch of the People’s Daily, the mouthpiece newspaper of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Having a 
verified account and more than 230,000 Weibo followers, on April 29, 2012, Lin questioned the 
multimillion death toll between 1960 and 1962. He asserted that the number was a conspiracy “to defile 
Chairman Mao by utilizing the exaggerated slander of millions of people dying of starvation.”3 
 
Lin’s tweet quickly ignited outrage among Weibo users, with criticism directed toward his denial 
of the starvation and deaths of millions in the early 1960s. The tweet had been retweeted over 7,000 
times within four hours of being published, with the original one receiving more than 5,000 comments, 
most of which were scorching critiques. Apart from criticism of Lin, numerous Weibo users started to 
explore and distribute various kinds of historical materials that demonstrated conclusively that millions of 
deaths occurred in the early 1960s because of the famine, which has long been a politically taboo topic 
(Branigan, 2013) in China. These materials included, among others, previously hard-to-access CPC 
archives and documents, rarely seen government statistics, banned or censored works and documentary 
films, and, in particular, long-forgotten personal memoirs, stories, and shared memories about that 
period. For instance,  
 
@Kai-fu Lee: In 1960, my grandma died of hunger. My uncle and his two kids passed 
away in those years. [I am] not sure if the reason was starvation, but their deaths 
definitely had something to do with the environment of that time. (Lee, 2012) 
 
@Bei Dafei (Weibo nickname): My parents’ hometown is located in the northern part of 
Suzhou city. I called them and asked whether there were people who died of hunger 
during the Great Famine. My father said that one hungry cousin came to visit his 
neighbor for something to eat. However, the neighbor did not have extra food to give 
him. After a few days, the cousin died of hunger. My mother said that quite a few 
children ate too much potherb and were poisoned to death, including the little daughter 
of her high school headmaster. (see more from Xue, 2012) 
 
The various mnemonic activities related to the exploration of the Great Famine on Weibo 
articulated a contrapuntal memory of the period against the official one that never admitted that the 
famine actually happened, fundamentally contributing to the process of recognition and reconstruction of 
the social memory of the famine. For instance, an online survey after the debate, with more than 12,000 
Weibo users participating, demonstrated that seven of 10 participants believed the conclusion that 30 
million people—or even more—starved to death over the three years of 1959–1960, which is quite a bit 
more than the official narrative, which reported that approximately 10 million died (Zhao & Liu, 2015, p. 
                                               
3 For Lin’s tweet, see Zhao and Liu (2015, p. 43). 
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48). In this process, the term the Great Famine, which calls for reflection on the famine as a political 
calamity that was “born [out] of the system of totalitarianism” (Mirsky, 2012, p. BR22), is gradually taking 
the place of the ones from the authorities that attribute millions of deaths by starvation to either natural 
disasters or the Soviet Union’s treachery (History Section of People’s Education Press, 2003, pp. 109–110). 
 
The Debates Over Historical Figures on Weibo 
 
The debates over historical figures on Weibo include doubts about their actual existence or details 
in their biographies, accusations that these so-called heroes were actually corrupt and profligate, and 
cynicism toward the official narratives of their heroism. The debate over Lei Feng—an iconic Mao-era 
soldier who exemplified unswerving devotion to communist ideology and fanatic loyalty to the leader of 
the CPC (“Lei Feng,” 2011)—fermented on Weibo at the beginning of March 2012, around the time that 
the government commemorates Lei Feng with the annual “Learn From Lei Feng Day” on March 5, a 
holiday initiated by Mao Zedong in 1962. The government’s effort to exalt and resuscitate the 
unconditional self-sacrifice and obedient patriotism of Lei Feng, however, has evoked unprecedented 
controversy, criticism, incredulity, and cynicism toward the authenticity of the received history of Lei Feng 
on Weibo (M. Liu, 2012). Some expressed their skepticism about the authenticity of his diaries that 
contain circumstantial details about how he helped people and expressed his great spirit. For instance, 
many questioned how Lei Feng, “nearly illiterate,” could have possibly composed voluminous diaries with 
literary flourish and flawless language.4 Others doubted the authenticity of pictures shot by professional 
photographers of Lei Feng doing good deeds, even though he was still an obscure soldier.5 
 
Among others, Ren Zhiqiang, a property developer and a Weibo celebrity with more than 35 
million Weibo followers, leveled the following critique:  
 
As a tamed tool for class struggle, the image of Lei Feng has been established to meet 
the needs of the Cultural Revolution. After turning all citizens into screws that can be 
willfully placed anywhere, there is no need for democracy, human rights, or freedom [in 
China]. (Ren, 2012) 
 
Ren’s tweet was forwarded more than 27,000 times within 24 hours, with more than 10,000 
comments, his argument resonating with most of the Weibo users’ own reflections on “the ridiculous 
                                               
4 For instance, see the tweet by He Weifang, a law professor with more than 1.7 million Weibo followers (He, 
2012). 
5 For instance, the tweet by Pu Zhiqiang, a well-known human rights lawyer, underlined that “one of the 
biggest lies of the last 60 years is Lei Feng. He hoodwinked me for two decades, actively pandering to his 
promoters, his diaries a collective creation. A monthly allowance of seven or eight yuan and he’s making 
100-yuan donations–either that’s fiction or there’s corruption involved. Back then, 30 million died from 
starvation, people my age might have taken a single photograph, and yet when he’s up late at night 
studying Mao with a flashlight, there are people taking pictures! He left thousands of photos behind! 
Beijing police, if you want to arrest hidden forces, go arrest the hidden forces behind Lei Feng” (Pu, 2013). 
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brainwashing stories” from “the wretched propaganda campaigns” that they remembered, such as the one 
about Lei Feng. 
 
Also in this process, many newly discovered photos of Lei Feng went viral on Weibo, showing a 
distinct image of Lei Feng from the official narrative. In one of the photos, for instance, the selfless 
communist soldier rode a motorcycle—a luxurious thing at that time—in Tiananmen Square. Criticism 
accordingly mushroomed, asking how Lei Feng, supposedly a lowly soldier and known for his frugality, 
could somehow afford a motorcycle unless he was either “corrupt and profligate” or part of false 
propaganda campaign by the authorities. 
 
Similar to the incredulity over the authenticity of Lei Feng’s stories, skepticism has raged on 
Weibo about the truth of the tales of several other historical figures, such as Huang Jiguang, who hurled 
himself against an enemy machine gun to block its fire; Qiu Shaoyun, who chose to silently burn to death 
to protect his unit’s location; and Dong Cunrui, who sacrificed his life by detonating a package of 
explosives under an enemy’s bunker (e.g., “Doubts,” 2015; Yao & Yang, 2015). Some challenged the idea 
that Qiu’s ability to remain silent while burning to death defies their understanding of human physiology. 
Others argued that Huang’s story was fabricated because it was impossible to block bullets fired by a 
strafing machine gun with one’s body. For Dong Cunrui, Weibo users believed that the improbable heroic 
deed was pure imagination because nobody saw it. This doubt and questioning of historical heroes’ 
authenticity snowballed on Weibo, despite the government’s effort to “authenticate the historical stories of 
these heroes” (Chen & Tan, 2015) by large-scale propaganda campaigns. 
 
Findings and Discussions 
 
In the debates over this particular historical event and these public figures, Weibo first provides a 
platform for individuals—be they eyewitnesses or not—to participate in narrating the past in different 
ways, which consequently contributes to an unprecedented level of openness in the process of social 
remembrance. Abundant historical materials that were previously either unavailable to the public or 
banned from publication because of the censorship—in particular, individual memories and experiences 
that have been unknown to people until now—finally came to light as the debate evolved. Second, as 
counter- and alternative frameworks for social memories, the articulation, dissemination, and aggregation 
of these materials emerge, develop, and proliferate on Weibo very quickly, with significant influence on 
society. These frameworks argue against, query, or satirize the official, orthodox frameworks for historical 
narratives, further generating and superimposing new historical knowledge. Third, the archiving and 
storage of these materials on Weibo also allow them to be easily retrieved and reactivated. In this way, 
the commemoration of the past is being continually produced, accessed, and updated. To summarize, 
Weibo cultivates the dynamics of social remembering as a crowd-sourced, continuous, accumulating, and 
sometimes temporarily dormant but reactivatable process, which shapes the commemoration of historical 
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Engagement of Individuals in the Practice of Narrating the Past 
 
In the age of mass media, forms of mass communication such as newspapers, magazines, and TV 
play a key role in the presentation and distribution of narratives of the past (e.g., Schwartz, 1991; 
Shapira & Wiskind-Elper, 1995). With the development of digital technologies, the emergence of weblogs 
allows witnesses of historical events to share their memories without depending on mass communication 
(in the case of China, see G. Yang, 2005; Zhang, 2012). Nevertheless, a specific cohort—the CR generation—
remains the dominant group in articulating retrospective narratives of a specific period in history (e.g., CR 
memories; G. Yang, 2005, pp. 24–25). Different from digital media such as weblogs or bulletin board 
systems, microblogging social media platforms such as Weibo open opportunities for individuals to engage in 
narrating the past via various mnemonic practices (e.g., Keightley & Schlesinger, 2014). 
 
In China, sites dedicated to the maintenance and (re)production of the historical past, such as 
educational institutions, museums, and mass media, have been monopolized by the party-state. This 
allows the authorities to claim to speak about the past in the voice of the nation, while leaving the 
ordinary person almost no space to speak up but only to accept and follow the official frameworks for 
memory. However, as studies (e.g., Hubbert, 2006; G. Yang, 2005) have uncovered, individual agents 
play a central role in negotiating mnemonic meanings and even engendering alternative interpretations of 
the past. In the cases here, similarly, a large number of individuals have involved themselves in various 
mnemonic practices of the historical issues on Weibo. More specifically, the participants in the debates 
include not only those who previously monopolized or had access to the narrative of the past, such as the 
government and its controlled mass media (via their verified Weibo accounts), but also people from all 
walks of life, whether they experienced these historical events directly or not. For instance, in the case of 
the Great Famine, both Weibo celebrities and ordinary users joined the debate by articulating, 
commenting, and distributing narratives, stories, memoirs, and numbers of deaths over the historical 
period to a wider scope. 
 
Most important, this process characterizes the emergence and recognition of the individual 
narrative, memoir, and memory of the past, be it from a Weibo celebrity or from an ordinary person. In 
practice, the tweets embody the point that both celebrities and ordinary Weibo users and their family 
members—including those who experienced the Great Famine period but had never shared their 
experiences, stories, and memories with others as they did not have Weibo accounts or because they did 
not have Internet access—joined the debate as individuals, directly or indirectly, by speaking out about 
their personal memories. As Halbwachs (1992) stresses, “while the collective memory endures and draws 
strength from its base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals [emphasis added] as group members 
who remember” (p. 22). These individual historical narratives introduce concrete human beings and their 
suffering into the commemoration of the past, which has been largely missing from existing (state-
generated) narratives of the past (Zhao & Liu, 2015, p. 44). In this way, participation in the narration of 
the past on Weibo establishes a process in which individual memories and experiences, including those of 
suffering and loss, from those who survived the famine and those who died of starvation—that had never 
been included or mentioned in the official frameworks of national memory—have been recognized, 
communicated, and are now known by a growing number of people. 
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Similar situations occurred in the debates over the heroic historical figures, in which Weibo offers 
unprecedented opportunities for individuals to question, criticize, or satirize the official historical 
narratives. This process consequently breaks the regime’s monopoly on the access to narratives of the 
past by acknowledging and integrating individuals’ remembrances and mnemonic practices into the 
recollection of the past and by introducing and accumulating alternative and counterframeworks of 
memory against the official one. 
 
Establishment of Counter- and Alternative Frameworks for Memories 
 
The debates on Weibo engender the articulation, accumulation, and proliferation of alternative and 
counterhistorical narratives about the historical period and figures through crowdsourcing, with Weibo users 
voluntarily involving themselves in different kinds of mnemonic practices through various media texts. 
 
Weibo allows its users to post and distribute information in various modes, such as text, photos, 
music, short videos, or a combination of multimodal contents. It is also possible to embed long-form 
content and links from other websites into the tweet. Tweets on Weibo, therefore, become content-rich, 
descriptive, and vivid. In practice, the technological affordances of Weibo enable its users to present and 
accumulate (e.g., by using hashtags) an abundance of historical materials covering the specific issue by 
crowdsourcing. As such, many of the historical archives and documentaries that were previously 
unavailable to the public have now been aggregated on Weibo and exposed to the public for the first time. 
 
For instance, in the case of the Great Famine, historical materials, including the CPC’s documents 
and archives, books that had been censored by the government (e.g., Dikötter, 2010; J. Yang, 2012), and 
overseas documentaries that people rarely encountered before, have recently been tweeted and diffused 
to a wide audience to the testify to the existence of the famine.  
 
Among them, one of the most prominent materials includes stories from Tombstone (J. Yang, 
2012). Uncovering a series of colossal tragedies, including instances of cannibalism and the continued 
systematic efforts of the CPC to cover up the history of the Great Famine, Tombstone has been banned in 
the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, its influence has snowballed in the debate over the Great Famine on 
Weibo after people quoted or referred to the stories in it. For instance, 
 
@Huoshan Baiyang (Weibo nickname, verified as a journalist from Xinhua News 
Agency): I was born in the mid-1970s . . . so I did not have any experience with the 
famine deaths in the 1960s. But . . . I read Yang Jisheng’s Tombstone. I believed in 
what they said. (see Xue, 2012)  
 
Similarly, in the debates over heroic historical figures, Weibo users dug up and further tweeted 
lesser known texts, a majority of which have never appeared or been widespread in the media before. For 
instance, the image of Lei Feng on a motorcycle in front of Tiananmen Square immediately attracted 
extraordinary attention and distribution on Weibo, as the official narrative never associates Lei Feng with 
the concept of “luxury,” as having a motorcycle in 1960s would have demonstrated. 
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Most important, the accumulation of these historical materials entails a fundamentally different 
narrative of the historical period and figures from this time that were provided by the dominant official 
discourse as the prescribed, authorized social framework of memory. The criticism and cynicism toward 
the official, orthodox—and previously hegemonic—framework accordingly emerged and were widely 
diffused. 
 
For instance, the historical materials and archives crowd-sourced by Weibo users about the Great 
Famine not only highlight the enormous number 30 million as the population that suffered from starvation 
during the period 1959–1962, but also excoriate both the CPC’s mistaken policy and the practice of 
holding back the truth about these mistakes made by the authorities. These narratives are significantly 
distinguished from the official discourse and the dominant memorial framework of the period, which, 
according to either the official chronicle of the CPC (Central Party History Research Office, 2011) or the 
historical textbook (History Section of People’s Education Press, 2003, p. 109), never used the term the 
Great Famine. Instead, describing this period as the Three Years of Economic Difficulty or the Three Years 
of Natural Disasters, the official narrative of the historical period between 1959 and 1961 attributes the 
fact that approximately 10 million people were wiped out by starvation because of a series of unavoidable 
natural disasters and the Soviet Union’s “perfidious” withdrawal of experts and technicians from China and 
its request for payment for its industrial hardware, which exacerbated an already difficult situation and 
sped up the loss of life (History Section of People’s Education Press, 2003, pp. 109–110).  
 
However, a totally different narrative of the period has been established on Weibo, with its users 
accumulating counter- and alternative narratives of the period against the official framework. For one 
thing, people aggregated alternative stories, memoirs, and memories either from their own experiences or 
from their family to testify to the actual existence of the famine, which had been denied by the authorities 
and questioned by Lin’s tweet. These stories and memories, previously largely unknown to the public, had 
thereby been a relevant part of the proof of the famine and became known to more people. For instance, 
 
@Lu Gongmin (Weibo nickname): Between 1958 and 1960, my great-grandmother, 
seven people in my grandparents’ generation, my aunt and my uncle, a total of ten 
people, starved to death, one by one, in Tongwei County, Gansu Province. (Yun’er, 
2012) 
 
@Coding worker Zhao Ye (Weibo nickname, verified as a journalist): Just ended a call 
with my father, who mentioned that during the great famine period in the 1960s . . . 
there were over 100 people who died in our village . . . in Caohu Village, Anhui Province. 
. . . @Lin Zhibo If Director Lin is interested, I can bring you to my hometown and carry 
out some interviews. People aged 60 years old or older there all have similar memories 
[of the Great Famine] during that period. (Yun’er, 2012) 
 
Moreover, Weibo users collected different materials to argue against the death toll in the 
dominant framework of memory, which admitted that only 10 million people starved to death (Central 
Party History Research Office, 2011, pp. 368–369). For instance, with more than 2 million Weibo 
followers, economist Mao Yushi proposed his way of accounting for the death toll and estimated that the 
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number would be 36 million (Yun’er, 2012). Ordinary Weibo users also offered statistics they read from 
academic and historical documents and demonstrated their opinions about the death toll. Xiyue Jianglang 
(Weibo nickname), for instance, presented the numbers raised by American Sinologist Basil Ashton and 
Ansley J. Coale, former chair of the Population Association of America. According to his tweet, Ashton 
estimated that there were approximately “30 million excess deaths and about 33 million lost or postponed 
births” (Yun’er, 2012); Coale believed the death toll to be 27 million. As more and more Weibo users 
participated in searching, posting, and forwarding various historical materials, they further aggregated 
into alternative and counterframeworks. Such frameworks not only greatly challenged the authorities’ 
framework for memory by shaping the online debate, but also established the concept of the Great 
Famine, which gradually replaced the phrases “the Three Years of Economic Difficulty” or “the Three Years 
of Natural Disasters” in the later online survey. 
 
Apart from the emergence of alternative and counterframeworks, the doubt and cynicism over 
the established historical narrative also force the authorities to revise the official narrative of the figures or 
to admit the shallow propaganda effort in those years. In the case of Lei Feng, the authorities modified the 
narrative of a god-like ideal after the photo of him riding a motorcycle in front of Tiananmen Square went 
viral and drew criticism on Weibo, albeit not fundamentally (“Doubts,” 2015). Instead, they acknowledged 
that Lei Feng was also a fashionable young man, accordingly he “did almost all the fashionable things of 
his day,” such as “wearing a fashionable leather jacket” and “riding on a borrowed motorcycle” (“Doubts,” 
2015) to take a photo—all of which are considered to be luxury items at the time. In the face of doubts 
about the authenticity of Lei Feng’s impossibly squeaky-clean photos, the authorities admitted for the first 
time that some of the photos were posed shots (bupai) instead of scene photos, as they asserted 
previously (Wang, 2014). In this sense, Weibo entails a long-term influence on social remembrance and 
the framework for memory by facilitating the integration of newly emerging, crowd-sourced information 
from diversified subjects into the production of historical knowledge. 
 
The Changing Mechanism of the Production of Historical Knowledge 
 
The debate over the narrative of the past on Weibo, including the involvement of individuals who 
speak up about their memories, experiences, doubts, criticisms, and sense of cynicism toward the official 
historical narrative and the emergence of counter- and alternative frameworks against the once-
monopolized official framework for memory, crystallizes a crucial influence of social media on society and 
politics in contemporary China. Social media such as Weibo empower people to organize contentious 
activities in contemporary contested events, but they also allow them to engage in various mnemonic 
practices, through which people (re)construct social memory and further shape the production of historical 
knowledge in the society. More specifically, social media entail the transformation of the mechanism of the 
production of historical knowledge from the following three perspectives. 
 
First, social media embrace individuals in the production of the knowledge of the past by 
expanding opportunities for them to join in various kinds of mnemonic practices. Previously, the 
authorities monopolized the historical narratives of the past through, for instance, state-controlled mass 
media and other propaganda mechanisms. In this situation, individuals are but passive receivers who have 
to accept and follow the narratives and the official frameworks for memory. With social media, individuals, 
1688  Jun Liu International Journal of Communication 12(2018) 
with or without alternative memories that differ from the official story, are able to be active subjects of 
history and memory in commemorative activities; in this study, they spoke about previously unknown or 
lesser known memories and experiences, shared alternative and counternarratives, or questioned and 
challenged the authenticity of official stories. New knowledge of the past emerges and disseminates in this 
process, which consequently challenges, if not ends, the monopoly on the mechanisms of memory 
production held by the authorities. 
 
Second, social media offer a platform to aggregate individuals’ mnemonic narratives and 
practices into alternative and counterframeworks of the past. These frameworks not only challenge the 
hegemonic, official framework, but also encourage further participation of ordinary people into the process 
of social remembering. As Olick and Robbins (1998) argue, “groups can also use images of the past and 
struggles over history as vehicles for establishing their power or, perversely, lack of power” (p. 127). 
Following this argument, alternative and countermemories of the past serve as a political means—and in 
some case, facilitate political challenges—against the dominant power and its ideologically constructed 
history. In practice, as more and more social media users join the process of crowdsourcing and 
distribution, the accumulation of these memories and frameworks aggregates previously isolated, 
fragmented, or unorganized individual stories and experiences against the official framework, making 
participants recognize that they are not the minority with (officially) unrecognized memories in a society. 
This accordingly encourages more people to stand up and speak about their alternative memories and 
experiences. Moreover, as soon as these alternative and countermemories, discourses, and frameworks 
are diffused on social media, to ban or delete them completely becomes impossible, which allows more 
people to read voices that differ from the official one and, furthermore, to join the discussion and 
participate in these mnemonic practices. The engagement and aggregation of mnemonic narratives and 
practices on social media in the Chinese mainland hence have become an increasingly prominent issue, 
which differs from, for instance, the construction of collective memory in Hong Kong, where various social 
institutions, including school, family, and media, play complementary roles in transmitting the memory 
about the Tiananmen Square incident (e.g., Lee & Chan, 2013). In short, with the institutionalization of 
oppositional narratives (e.g., Pelak, 2015; Whitlinger, 2015) remaining unclear in the cases, the debates 
allow and further encourage previously silenced narratives in the face of oppressive histories to move from 
private to public spaces and to be acknowledged by the broader society, which raises critical 
consciousness and advances the struggle against historical hegemony. 
 
Third, by storing and archiving historical materials, including the debate, in a digitally networked 
sphere, social media make them easily retrievable with the potential to be reactivated. More specifically, 
for one thing, people can easily search, retrieve, revisit, and reflect on the material. For another thing, the 
easy retrievability embeds the possibility to reactivate the process of narrating the past any time by 
reengaging people in the production of historical narratives.6 In this way, the commemoration of the past 
is being continually produced, accessed, and updated. To summarize, Weibo cultivates the dynamics of 
                                               
6 In practice, the debate over the Great Famine was raised again in 2014, after Lanzhou University 
appointed Lin Zhibo as the dean of its journalism school. Weibo users immediately recalled the debate and 
posed strong criticism toward Lin, centering on his denial of the existence of the Great Famine and the 
deaths in that part of the Chinese history. 
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social remembering as a crowdsourcing, continuous, accumulating, and dormant but reactivatable 




The growing ubiquity of digital media has facilitated changes in political culture and power 
structures around the world. This study looks at the use of social media in the production of (alternative) 
historical knowledge and the (re)formation of social memory in contemporary China. By taking several 
contested debates over historical events and figures on Weibo as cases, this study demonstrates that 
social media embrace wide and diversified subjects to engage in the production of historical knowledge 
and facilitate the dissemination of alternative frameworks of memory as counterhegemonic discourse. The 
integration of fragmented, individual experiences and memories into the general historical knowledge and 
the facilitation of diversified mnemonic practices accordingly construct the social memory of the society. 
 
The study suggests two implications. First, the widespread availability and accessibility of social 
media empower individual’s mnemonic capacity by affording him/her with low-threshold access to 
“technologies of memory” (Armstrong & Crage, 2006, p. 745), through which individuals, as agents of 
commemoration, are able not only to speak about their memories, but, more important, to crowd-source 
historical narratives, aggregate diverse commemorative vehicles, and engage in sustained deliberation 
and public scrutiny for the enduring production of (contested) history knowledge. The production of social 
memory on social media thus differentiates from the one, for instance, on weblogs or websites that 
remains dominated by specific authors with topics that remain scattered throughout the Internet and are 
thus difficult to aggregate into special themes, as happens with Weibo. Instead, the mnemonic practices 
on social media embody an emergent production mechanism of historical knowledge that entails 
openness, collaboration, aggregation, reinvigoration, and sustainability. 
 
Second, the debate over historical narratives entails an ideological tension between the 
authorities and their citizens in contemporary China, in which the collaborative production of contestation 
memories struggles against state-dominated collective misremembering, disremembering, and forgetting 
for the ideological shaping of the citizenry. While the authorities reinforce and reappropriate dominant 
historical narratives as part of their current governing strategy suited to the new ideological work and 
cultural governance, people voice their suspicions of, distrust of, resistance to, and challenges of the 
authorities and their ideological discourse by questioning, rejecting, and contesting the received historical 
narrative. In this sense, the debate exemplifies the specific construction of the past for use in the present 
(Jansen, 2007, p. 959), transcending what happened in history and memory, and shedding light on the 
complex political and cultural contentions that are ongoing in contemporary China.  
 
Last but not the least, although this study provides some relevant points of departure for future 
research, its limitation concerns the issue of censorship, especially after the Chinese authorities recently 
tightened control to block material deemed subversive or socially unhealthy. Although the debates over 
the Great Famine and historical figures maintain on Weibo, the discussions on, for instance, CR or the 
Chinese student movement of 1989 remain highly banned subjects. A close examination of both censored 
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and surviving contents or accounts will give a more precise trajectory of the contingencies governing the 
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